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VoL 13, No.3 Summer 1990 
HEARSAY: PART Ill 
Paul C. Giannelli SEP 271990 Albert J. Weatherhead Ill & Richard W Weatherhead 
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University 
This is the third of a series of articles on the hearsay 
rule. The first article discussed the definition of hearsay. 
The second article examined a number of hearsay 
exceptions recognized in Ohio Rule 803 -those excep-
tions that do not require the declarant to be unavailable. 
This article considers additional hearsay exceptions 
recognized by Rule 803 as well as the unavailability 
requirements for the exceptions in Rule 804. 
BUSINESS RECORDS 
Rule 803(6) recognizes a hearsay exception for 
records of regularly conducted business activities. 
According to the Staff Note, the rule is "in substantial 
conformity with R.C. 2317.40, the Uniform Business 
Records as Evidence Act ... " 
Rule 803(6) requires: (1) a record of an act, event, or 
condition; (2) made at or near the time; (3) by, or from 
information transmitted by, a person with knowledge; (4) 
which was kept in the course of a regularly conducted 
business activity; (5) if it was the regular practice of that 
business activity to make the record; (6) as shown by the 
testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness or 
as provided by Rule 901(8)(10); (7) unless the source of 
information or the method or circumstances of prepara-
tion indicate a lack of trustworthiness. 
Records of regularly conducted business activities 
include memoranda, reports, records, or "data compila-
tion[s], in any form." "The expression 'data compilation' 
is used as broadly descriptive of any means of storing 
information other than the conventional words and 
figures in written or documentary form. It includes, but is 
by no means limited to, electronic computer storage." 
Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 803. In 
contrast, RC 2317.40 refers only to "records." See State v. 
Knox, 18 Ohio App.3d 36, 480 N.E.2d 120 (Cuyahoga 
1984) (computer printouts admitted). 
The reliability of business records "is said variously to 
be supplied by systematic checking, by regularity and 
continuity which produce habits of precision, by actual 
experience of business in relying upon them, or by a duty 
to make an accurate record as part of a continuing job or 
occupation." Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 
Public Defender Hyman Friedman 
803. See also 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1522 (Chadbourn 
rev. 1974). The Supreme Court recognized this rationale 
in Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio St. 416,72 N.E.2d 245 (1947): 
''The exception to the hearsay rule of evidence in such 
cases is based on the assumption that the records, made 
in the regular course of business by those who have a 
competent knowledge of the facts recorded and a self-
interest to be served through the accuracy of the entries 
made and kept with knowledge that they will be relied 
upon in a systematic conduct of such business, are 
accurate and trustworthy." /d. at 425-26. 
Regularly conducted activity; regularly kept record 
The rule requires that the record be "kept in the course 
of a regularly conducted business activity." The rule 
defines a business as an "institution, association, profes-
sion, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or 
not conducted for profit." This definition is coextensive 
with RC 2317.40 except for the addition of the term 
"association." The term business was defined broadly in 
the rule to include "the records of institutions and associ-
ations like schools, churches and hospitals ... " H.R. 
Rep. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] 
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7098, 7104 (Conference 
Report). Personal records are not admissible under this 
exception. The rule also requires that the record be the 
product of "the regular practice of that business activity." 
See RC 2317.40 (record made "in the regular course of 
business"); Kalna v. Fialko, 102 Ohio App. 442, 446, 125 
N.E.2d 565, 567 (1955) ("piece of paper was not a part of 
any system of the plaintiff in recording events of his 
business."). · 
Acts, events, and conditions 
The rule requires that the record concern "acts," 
"events," or "conditions." In contrast, Federal Rule 
803(6) extends the list of appropriate material to include 
"opinions or diagnoses." The omission of this phrase 
from the Ohio rule does not necessarily mean that opin-
ions and diagnoses are inadmissible. RC 2317.40, which 
also defines records in terms of "act, condition, and 
event," has been interpreted by the Ohio courts to admit 
medical diagnoses. See Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio St. 416, 
Cuyahoga County Public Defender Office, 1200 Ontario Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
Telephone (216) 443-7223 
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72 N.E.2d 245, 250 (1947) (hospital or physician's office 
record may include "diagnosis by one qualified to make 
it ... ");Dillow v. Young, 3 Ohio App.2d 110, 113, 209 
N.E.2d 623, 626 (1965), reversed on other grounds, 6 
Ohio St.2d 221,217 N.E.2d 868 (1966) (record of medical 
diagnosis made by a qualified doctor may be admitted). 
Moreover, the Staff Note to Rule 803(6) indicates that 
these prior cases may have survived adoption of the rule: 
The Ohio rule departs from the Federal Evidence 
rule by deleting "opinions and diagnoses" as admissi-
ble under this section. It is not clear how far present 
Ohio law permits such evidence to be admitted. In 
Hytha v. Schwendeman (1974), 40 Ohio App. 2d 478, 
the Franklin County Court of Appeals set forth seven 
criteria for a diagnosis to be admissible when 
contained in a hospital record. The Hytha case may 
retain validity insofar as it may assist in determining 
the point at which, in medical records, an act, event, or 
condition admissible under the exception becomes an 
impermissible opinion or diagnosis under the rule. 
The Staff Note apparently refers to the syllabus of Hytha 
v. Schwendeman; which reads: 
Before the record of a medical diagnosis made by a 
physician may be admitted into evidence, pursuant to 
R. C. 2317.40 (Records, as evidence), the following 
factors must be present: 
(1) The record must have been a systematic entry 
kept in the records of the hospital or physician and 
made in the regular course of business; 
(2) The diagnosis must have been the result of well-
known and accepted objective testing and examining 
practices and procedures which are not of such a tech-
nical nature as to-require cross-examination; 
(3) The diagnosis must n()t have rested solely upon 
the subjective complaints of the patient; 
(4) The diagnosis must have been made by a quali-
fied person; 
(5) The evidence sought to be introduced must be 
competent and relevant; 
(6) If the use of the record is for the purpose of prov-
ing the truth of matter asserted at trial, it must be the 
product of the party seeking its admission; 
(7) It must be properly authenticated. /d. 
Element (4) is required whenever a report contains the 
opinion of an expert. See Rule 702 (qualifications of 
expert witnesses). Element (5) is required by Rule 401, 
the basic rule on relevancy. Elements (1) and (7) simply 
restate conditions which all business records must meet 
to be admitted under Rule 803(6). Thus, admissibility of a 
record of medical diagnosis appears to turn on elements 
(2) and (3), with the significance of (3) diminished by the 
fact that a physician rarely makes a diagnosis "solely 
upon the subjective complaint of the patient.'' 
Other cases on this issue include: Green v. Cleveland, 
150 Ohio St. 441,83 N.E.2d 63 (1948) (statement 
concerning cause of accident in hospital record exclud-
ed); Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio St. 416, 72 N.E.2d 245 (1947) 
(hospital chart records including blood and urine analy-
sis admitted); Dorsten v. Lawrence, 20 Ohio App.2d 297, 
253 N.E.2d 804 (1969) (statement of lack of fault in hospi-
tal record excluded). 
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Time requirement 
The rule requires that the record have been "made at 
or near the time" of the act, event, or condition. RC 
2317.40 contains an identical provision. The time require-
ment is one of the conditions that ensures the reliability 
of business records. McCormick advocated a flexible 
approach in applying this requirement: "Whether an 
entry made subsequent to the transaction has been 
made within a sufficient time to render it within the 
exception depends upon whether the time span between 
the transaction and the entry was so great as to suggest 
a danger of inaccuracy by lapse of memory." McCormick, 
Evidence § 309 (3d ed. 1984). See also 5 Wigmore, 
Evidence§ 1526 (Chadbourn rev. 1974). 
Firsthand knowledge; business duty 
The rule provides that the record must have been 
made by a person with knowledge of the act, event, or 
condition or from information transmitted by a person 
with such knowledge. This provision does not require 
that the "person with knowledge" be produced at trial or 
identified. The Senate Judiciary Committee wrote: 
It is the understanding of the committee that the use 
of the phrase "person with knowledge" is not intended 
to imply that the party seeking to introduce the 
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation . 
must be able to produce, or even identify, the specific 
individual upon whose first-hand knowledge the 
memorandum, report, record or data compilation was 
based. A sufficient foundation for the introduction of 
such evidence will be laid if the party seeking to 
introduce the evidence is able to show that it was the 
regular practice of the activity to base such memoran-
dums, reports, records, or data compilations upon a 
transmission from a person with knowledge, e.g., in the 
case of the content of a shipment of goods, upon a 
report from the company's receiving agent or in the 
case of a computer printout, upon a report from the 
company's computer programmer or one who has 
knowledge of the particular record system. S. Rep. No. 
1277, 93d Gong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. 
Code Con g. & Ad. News 7051, 7063-64. 
The firsthand knowledge requirement presents no 
problem when the person making the record had 
personal knowledge of the act, event, or condition. The 
difficult cases involve records in which the supplier of 
information does not make the record, but transmits the 
information to another person who makes the record. If 
both the supplier and recorder are acting in the regular 
course of business, the record is admissible; the supplier 
is under a duty to transmit the information and the 
recorder is under a duty to make the record. The recorder 
need not have firsthand knowledge of the event. See 
McCormick, Evidence§ 310 (3d ed. 1984). 
The situation is different if the supplier is not under a 
duty to transmit the information. 
If ... the supplier of the information does not act in the 
regular course, an essential link is broken; the assur-
ance of accuracy does not extend to the information 
itself, and the fact that it may be recorded with scrupu-
lous accuracy is of no avail. An illustration is the police 
report incorporating information obtained from a 
bystander: the officer qualifies as acting in the regular 
course but the informant does not. The leading case, 
Johnson v. Lutz, 253 N.Y. 124, 170 N.E. 517 (1930), held 
that a report thus prepared was inadmissable .... The 
rule follows this lead in requiring an informant with know-
f ledge acting in the course of the regularly conducted 
activity. Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 803. 
Double Hearsay 
If the supplier is not under a duty to transmit the infor-
mation, the record may nevertheless be admissible, but 
only if the supplier's statement falls within another hear-
say exception. This situation presents a double hearsay 
problem, and admissibility is governed by Rule 805. For 
example, if the statement by the supplier is made for the 
purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment, the statement 
may qualify under Rule 803(4). 
If, however, the supplier is not acting pursuant to a 
business duty and his statement does not fit into another 
exception, the statement is inadmissible. See Mastran v. 
Urichich, 37 Ohio St.3d 44, 48, 523 N.E.2d 509 (1988) 
(patient's statements in hospital record about accident 
that have "no reference to his medical or surgical treat-
ment" are inadmissible); Schmitt v. Doehler Die Casting 
Co., 143 Ohio St. 421, 55 N.E.2d 644 (1944); Hytha v. 
Schwendeman, 40 Ohio App.2d 478, 484, 320 N.E.2d 
312, 317 (1974) (" 'hearsay on hearsay,' in the absence of 
other exceptions to the general hearsay rule, is not 
admissible, even in view of the business records as 
evidence statute."); Dillow v. Young, 3 Ohio App.2d 110, 
113, 209 N.E.2d 623, 625 (1965), reversed on other 
grounds, 6 Ohio St.2d 221, 217 N.E.2d 868 (1966); Ohio 
Credit Corp. v. Brigham, 25 Misc. 241,266 N.E.2d 867 
(Muni. 1970). 
Method of proof 
The rule provides that the foundation for the admissi-
bility of business records may be "shown by the testimony 
of the custodian or other qualified witness or as provided 
by Rule 901(b)(10) ... "The reference to Rule 901(8)(1)(10), 
which governs methods of authentication, does not 
appear in the federal rule. According to the Staff Note, 
"[t]his language was added to clearly permit the admis-
sion of records which qualify as self-authenticating 
pursuant to statute such as hospital records under R.C 
2317.422." 
RC 2317.40 outlines a similar method of proof; it 
requires "the custodian or the person who made such 
record or under whose supervision such record was 
made [to] testif[y] to its identity and the mode of its prepa-
ration ... "See also State v. Kehn, 50 Ohio St.2d 11, 361 
N.E.2d 1330 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 858 (1977) 
(bank deposit slips authenticated by custodian); 
Hardesty v. Corrova, 27 Ohio App.3d 332, 501 N.E.2d 81 
(Franklin 1986) (record need not be authenticated by 
person who made the postings). 
Lack of trustworthiness 
A record that satisfies the requirements of Rule 803(6) 
may nevertheless be excluded if "the source of informa-
:- tion or the method or circumstances of preparation indi-
cate lack of trustworthiness." The leading case on this 
point is Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943), in which 
the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the federal business 
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records statute as excluding an accident report prepared 
by an employee of the defendant-railroad company. The 
report was excluded not because it was untrustworthy, 
but rather because it was not made "in the regular 
course of business." According to the Court, the primary 
use of the report was "in litigating, not in railroading." /d. 
at 113-14. Palmer v. Hoffman has been criticized (See 
McCormick, Evidence§ 308 (3d ed. 1984), and the feder-
al drafters decided to deal explicitly with the problem of 
unreliable records by including the "lack of trustworthi-
ness" requirement. 
RC 2317.40 contains a similar provision- admission 
of the record is proper "if, in the opinion of the court, the 
sources of information, method, and time of preparation 
were such as to justify [the record's] admission." In addi-
tion, the courts have recognized that "if it should appear 
that such records have been made and kept solely for a 
self-serving purpose of the party offering them in 
evidence, it would be the duty of a trial court to refuse to 
admit them." Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio St. 416, 426, 72 
N.E.2d 245, 251 (1947). Accordingly, "litigation records" 
may be excluded. McCormick v. Mirrored Image, Inc., 7 
Ohio App.3d 232, 234, 454 N.E.2d 1363 (Hamilton 1982). 
However, "[p]roof of one error in an account record 
does not render the record inadmissible." Hardesty v. 
Corrova, 27 Ohio App.3d 332, 335, 501 N.E.2d 81 (Frank-
lin 1986). 
PUBLIC RECORDS 
Rule 803(8) recognizes a hearsay exception for public 
records and reports. A number of other rules also deal 
with public records. Rule 1005, by permitting the use of 
certified copies, recognizes an exception to the best 
evidence rule for public records. Authentication of public 
records is governed by Rule 901(8)(7), (10), and 902. 
Under Rule 902 many public records are self-authenti-
cating and thus admissible without any need to produce 
an authenticating witness. If a public record contains a 
statement which is itself hearsay, admissibility is 
governed by Rule 805 (multiple hearsay). See also 
Westinghouse Electric Corp v. Dolly Madison Leasing & 
Furniture Corp, 42 Ohio St.2d 122, 326 N.E.2d 651 
(1975). 
Rule 803(8) provides that records kept by a public 
office or agency setting forth "(a) the activities of the 
office or agency, or (b) matters observed pursuant to duty 
imposed by law as to which there was a duty to report" 
are admissible. 'Justification for the exception is the 
assumption that a public official will perform his duty 
properly and the unlikelihood that he will remember 
details independently of the record." Advisory Commit-
tee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 803. See also McCormick, 
Evidence § 315 (3d ed. 1984); 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 
1632 (Chadbourn rev. 1974). 
The exception is subject to two limitations. In criminal 
cases, records containing matters observed by police 
officers and other law enforcement personnel are inad-
missible if offered by the prosecution. Moreover, if the 
"sources of information or other circumstances indicate 
lack of trustworthiness," the record is inadmissible. The 
latter provision is identical to one found in the business 
records exception. Evid. R. 803(6). 
Federal Rule 803(8) contains an additional subdivision 
which provides: "(C) in civil actions and proceedings and 
against the Government in criminal cases, factual find-
ings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to 
authority granted by law" are admissible. See Beech 
Aircraft Corp v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153 (1988). This provi-
sion was not adopted in Ohio. Consequently, evaluative 
reports are not admissible under Ohio Rule 803(8). 
Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Volkswagen, Inc, 41 Ohio App.3d 
239, 535 N.E.2d 702 (1987)(NHTSA reports excluded). 
Comparison with Statute 
Rule 803(8) is similar to RC 2317.42, which provides: 
"Official reports made by officers of this state, or certified 
copies of the same, on a matter within the scope of their 
duty as defined by statute, shall, in so far as relevant, be 
admitted as evidence of the matters stated therein." 
There are several differences between the rule and 
statute. The statute uses the term "official reports," 
whereas the rule uses the phrase "[r]ecords, reports, 
statements, or data compilations, in any form." The term 
"data compilation" refers to computer-generated 
records. 
In addition, the statute covers only official reports 
"made by officers of this state." See State v. Colvin, 19 
Ohio St.2d 86, 249 N.E.2d 784 (1969); Mazzeo v. Board 
of Liquor Control, 73 Abs. 94, 136 N.E.2d 663 (App. 
1955). In contrast, the rule refers to records of "public 
officers and agencies." This language is intended to 
encompass the records of federal agencies as well as 
the records of agencies of other states. See Advisory 
Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 803 ("The rule makes no 
distinction between federal and nonfederal offices and 
agencies."). The statute also permits the use of "certified 
copies." Although Rule 803(8) does not address this 
issue, Rule 1005 permits the use of certified copies of 
public records. 
Records of activities of the office or agency 
Rule 803(8)(a) provides for the admission of records 
setting forth the "activities of the office or agency." The 
Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 803 contains 
the following examples: "Cases illustrating the admissi-
bility of records of the office's or agency's own activities 
are numerous. Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Co. v. 
United States, 250 U.S. 123 (1919), Treasury records of 
miscellaneous receipts and disbursements; Howard v. 
Perrin, 200 U.S. 71 (1906), General Land Office records; 
Ballew v. United States, 160 U.S. 187 (1895), Pension 
Office records." 
The prior Ohio cases include: State v. Walker, 53 Ohio 
St.2d 192, 374 N.E.2d 132 (1978) (records of proper cali-
bration of breath analysis machine admitted); State v. 
Smith, 55 Ohio App.2d 202, 380 N.E.2d 353 (1977) (record 
of notice of suspension of driver's license admitted). 
Matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law 
Rule 803(8)(b) provides for the admission of records 
setting forth "matters observed pursuant to duty imposed 
by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, 
excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed 
by police officers and other law enforcement personnel, 
unless offered by defendant." The Advisory Committee's 
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Note to Federal Rule 803 contains the following examples: 
Cases sustaining admissibility of records of matters 
observed are also numerous. United States v. Van 
Hook, 284 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1960), remanded for. .. 
resentencing 365 U.S. 609, 81 S.Ct. 823, 5 L.Ed.2d 821, .~ 
letter from induction officer to District Attorney, ' 
pursuant to army regulations, stating fact and circum-
stances of refusal to be inducted; TKach v. United 
States, 242 F.2d 937 (5th Cir. 1957), affidavit of White 
House personnel officer that search of records showed 
no employment of accused, charged with fraudulently 
representing himself as an envoy of the President; 
Minnehaha County v. Kelley, 150 F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 
1945); Weather Bureau records of rainfall; United 
States v. Meyer, 113 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1940), cert. 
denied 311 U.S. 706, 61 S.Ct. 174, 85 L.Ed. 459, map 
prepared by government engineer from information 
furnished by men working under his supervision. 
The prior Ohio cases include: Westinghouse Electric 
Corp v. Dolly Madison Leasing & Furniture Corp, 42 Ohio 
St.2d 122, 326 N.E.2d 651 (1975) (fire department report 
admissible but statements of third persons contained in 
report inadmissible); Carson v. Metropolitan Life Insur-
ance Co., 156 Ohio St. 104, 100 N.E.2d 197 (1951) 
(coroner's report admissible but opinion as to suicide 
inadmissible). 
For "a document to be admissible under Ohio Evid. R. 
803(8)(b), the observations of the reporter must occur 
pursuant to a legally imposed duty and the matters 
observed must be the subject of a duty to report. More-
over, the observations must be either the firsthand ob-
servations of the official making the report or of one with • 
a duty to report to a public official." Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. , 
Volkswagen, Inc., 41 Ohio App.3d 239,242,535 N.E.2d 
702 (1987). 
Police Reports 
The exclusion of police reports in criminal cases is 
based on the concern that admissibility of these reports 
would impinge upon an accused's right of confrontation. 
The Supreme Court has commented: 
We interpret the exclusionary language of Evid. R. 
803(8) as consistent with the law prior to its adoption. 
The phrase, "excluding, however, in criminal cases 
matters observed by police officers and other law 
enforcement personnel ***," prohibits the introduction 
of reports which recite an officer's observations of 
criminal activities or observations made as part of an 
investigation of criminal activities. This phrase does 
not prohibit introduction of records of a routine, intra-
police, or machine maintenance nature, such as intox-
ilyzer calibration logs. Such routine records are highly 
likely to be reliable, and are precisely the type contem-
plated as admissible by the public records exception to 
the rule against hearsay. State v. Ward, 15 Ohio St.3d 
355, 358, 474 N.E.2d 300 (1984). 
In contrast to the federal rule, Rule 803(8)(b) includes 
the phrase "unless offered by defendant." According to 
the Staff Note, "[s]uch exculpatory reports should be t 
available to the defendant since none of the constitution- ··, 
al hazards of confrontation are involved in making such 
reports admissible on behalf of defendants." See also 
United States v. Smith, 521 F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
If a record is excluded because it involves a matter 
observed by police officers or other law enforcement 
personnel, the question remains whether the record may 
be admitted under the business records exception (Rule 
803(6)). In United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 
1977), the court answered the question in the negative. 
Other courts, however, have reached the opposite result. 
See 4 Louisell & Mueller, Federal Evidence 770-776 
(1980); 4 Weinstein & Berger, Weinstein's Evidence ~ 
803(8)[04] (1987); Annat, 37 ALR. Fed. 831 (1978); Annat, 
31 ALR. Fed. 457 (1977). 
There may be a conflict between the rule and RC 
2925.51, which provides for the admission of laboratory 
reports in controlled substance prosecutions. Such a report 
would appear to fall within the exclusion of matters 
observed by law enforcement personnel in criminal cases. 
See United States v. Oates, supra; 4 Louisell & Mueller, 
Federal Evidence 750-57 (1980). RC 2925(C) requires ex-
clusion of the report if the accused "demands the testimony 
· of the person signing the report." Failure to make a demand 
could be construed as a waiver of Rule 803(8)(b). See 
also State v. Reese, 56 App2d 278,382 N.E.2d 1193 
(1978) (failure to serve copy of report on accused renders 
report inadmissible); Giannelli; The Admissibility of 
Laboratory Reports in Criminal Trials: The Reliability of 
Scientific Proof, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 671 (1988). 
OHIO RULE 804 
Rule 804 specifies five hearsay exceptions that 
require a showing that the declarant is unavailable to 
testify at trial. Rule 804 must be read in conjunction with 
Rule 801, which defines hearsay, and Rule 802, which 
excludes hearsay evidence in the absence of an exception. 
Rule 804(A) contains five conditions of unavailability. 
By adopting a uniform ruie of unavailability that applies 
to all the exceptions recognized in subdivision (B), the 
rule differs from the common law, under which each 
exception had developed its own conditions of unavaila-
bility. For example, the common law unavailability 
requirements for former testimony, dying declarations, 
and declarations against interest were not identical. 
It is the unavailability of the declarant's testimony, 
rather than the unavailability of the declarant, that is 
determinative. Thus, if the declarant is present in court 
but claims a valid privilege, refuses to testify, or suffers a 
lack of memory, his testimony is unavailable, and the 
hearsay statements falling within the enumerated excep-
tions of subdivision (B) are admissable. 
The rule also provides that a "declarant is not unavaila-
ble as a witness if his exemption, refusal, claim of lack of 
memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or 
wrongdoing of the proponent of his statement for the pur-
pose of preventing the witness from attending or testifying." 
The burden of establishing unavailability rests on the 
party offering the evidence. See State v. Young, 5 Ohio 
St.3d 221, 223, 450 N.E.2d 1143 (1983); State v. Smith, 58 
Ohio St.2d 344, 390 N.E.2d 778 (1979), vacated on other 
grounds, 448 U.S. 902 (1980); New York Central R.R. Co. 
v. Stevens, 126 Ohio St. 395, 185 N.E. 542 (1933). 
Claim of privilege 
Rule 804(A) (1) provides that a declarant is unavailable 
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if "exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privi-
lege from testifying concerning the subject matter of his 
statement." Rule 501 governs the law of privilege. 
A witness who claims the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination is unavailable under the rule. 
See State v. Davis, 4 Ohio App.3d 199, 447 N.E.2d 139 
(1982). Rule 804(A)(1) is applicable only if the court 
decides that the claim of privilege is valid. See Advisory 
Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid 804 ("A ruling by the 
judge is required, which clearly implies that an actual 
claim of privilege must be made."). If the court decides 
the claim is not valid, but the witness persists in refusing 
to testify, Rule 804(A)(2) applies. 
Although the Staff Note cites the assertion of the 
husband-spouse privilege as an example of unavailabili-
ty, the Supreme Court has ruled that spousal incom-
petency under Rule 601(8) does not make the spouse 
unavailable under this rule. State v. Savage, 30 Ohio 
St.3d 1, 506 N.E.2d 196 (1987). 
Refusal to testify 
Rule 804(A)(2) provides that a declarant is unavailable 
if he "persists in refusing to testify concerning the 
subject matter of his statement despite an order of the 
court to do so." As the Staff Note indicates, this "provi-
sion extends the earlier rules governing unavailability, 
but the provision conforms to the modern weight of 
authority." See State v. Dick, 27 Ohio St.2d 162, 166, 271 
N.E.2d 797, 800 (1971) (indicating refusal to testify may 
not be a sufficient showing of unavailability); but see 
State v. Kilbane, 5 0.0.3d 383 (C.P. 1977). 
If a witness' refusal to testify is based on a claim of 
privilege, the court should rule on the validity of the 
claim. If the court rules the claim is not valid, continued 
refusal to testify may result in contempt. See State v. 
Williams, 38 Ohio St.3d 346, 347, 528 N.E.2d 910 (1988); 
State v. Jester, 32 Ohio St.3d 147, 153, 512 N.E.2d 962 
(1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1047 (1988); State v. Kilbane, 
61 Ohio St.2d 201,400 N.E.2d 386 (1980); State v. Antill, 
176 Ohio St. 61, 197 N.E.2d 548 (1964). Rule 804(A)(2), 
however, does not require the imposition of contempt as 
a condition for finding the declarant unavailable. 
Lack of memory 
Rule 804(A)(3) provides that a declarant is unavailable 
if he "testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of 
his statement." See State v. Young, 20 Ohio App.3d 269, 
485 N.E.2d 814 (Cuyahoga 1984). 
The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 804 
comments: "The position that a claimed lack of memory 
by the witness of the subject matter of his statement 
constitutes unavailability likewise finds support in the 
cases, though not without dissent. McCormick § 234, p. 
494. If the claim is successful, the practical effect is to 
put the testimony beyond reach, as in the other 
instances. In this instance, however, it will be noted that 
the lack of memory must be established by the testimony 
of the witness himself, which clearly contemplates his 
production and subjection to cross-examination." 
The following statement appears in the House Judiciary 
Report: "Rule 804(a)(3) was approved in the form 
submitted by the Court. However, the Committee intends 
no change in existing federal law under which the court 
may choose to disbelieve the declarant's testimony as to 
his lack of memory. See United States v. lnsana, 423 F.2d 
1165, 1169-1170 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 
(1970)." 
Death or illness 
Rule 804(A)(4) provides that a declarant is unavailable 
if he "is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing 
because of death or then existing physical or mental 
illness or infirmity." 
The rule is consistent with prior Ohio law. See RC 
2317.06 (former testimony admissible due to declarant's 
death, insanity, or "any physical or mental infirmity"); RC 
2945.49 (former testimony admissible due to declarant's 
death or incapacitation); Civ R. 32(A)(3) (deposition 
admissible due todeponent's cjeath, "age, sickness, infir-
mity"); Grim R. 15(F) (deposition admissible due to depo-
nent's death, "sickness or infirmity"); C. M. McKelvey Co. 
v. General Casualty Co., 166 Ohio St. 401, 142 N.E.2d 
854 (1957) (declaration against interest admissible due to 
"death," "sickness" or "insanity" of declarant); State v. 
Kindle, 47 Ohio St. 358, 24 N.E. 485 (1980) (dying decla-
ration admissible due to death). 
As the Staff Note points out, "a court will have to use its 
discretion is deciding that the mental or physical infirmity 
prohibits testifying." A continuance may resolve prob-
lems associated with a temporary infirmity. See Mitchell 
v. State, 40 Ohio App. 367, 178 N.E. 325 (1931). See also 
State v. Lamonge, 117 Ohio App. 143, 191 N.E.2d 207 
(1962), appeal dismissed, 174 Ohio St. 545, 190 N.E.2d 
691 (1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 942 (1963) (testimony of 
witness taken at his home). Because the test for insanity 
is not the same as the test for competency, an "insane" 
person may be a competent witness. 
Unable to procure attendance 
Rule 804(A)(5) provides that a declarant is unavailable 
if he "is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his 
statement has been unable to procure this attendance 
(or in the case of a hearsay exception under subdivision 
(8)(2), (3), or (4), his attendance or testimony) by process 
or other reasonable means." 
The rule governs situations in which the declarant's 
present whereabouts are unknown or the declarant is 
beyond the subpoena power of the court. Unavailability 
due to an inability to procure the attendance of the 
declarant has been the subject of a number of statutory 
and rule provisions. See HC 2317.06 (former testimony 
admissible if declarant "is beyond the jurisdiction of the 
court," "cannot be found after diligent search," or 
"summoned but appears to have been kept away by the 
adverse party"); RC 2945.49 (former testimony admissi-
ble if declarant "cannot for any reason be produced at 
the trial"); Grim. R. 15(F) (deposition admissible if "atten-
dance of the witness by subpoena" cannot be procured). 
The prior Ohio cases include: G.M. McKelvey Co. v. 
General Casualty Co., 166 Ohio St. 401, 142 N.E.2d 854 
(1957) (declaration against interest admissible due to 
declarant's "absence from the jurisdiction"); New York ( 
Central R.R. Co. v. Stevens, 126 Ohio St. 395, 185 N.E. 542 r 
(1933) (former testimony inadmissible; witnesses not 
beyond subpoena process); Mitchell v. State, 40 Ohio 
App. 367, 178 N.E. 325 (1931) (continuance required if 
witness is temporarily absent from state); State v. 
Preston, 10 0.0.3d 275 (C.P. 1978) (witness not unavaila-
ble because on vacation). 
The rule appears to go beyond prior law. In the case of 
dying declarations (Rule 804(8)(2)), statements against " 
interest (Rule 804(8)(3)), and statements of personal or 
family history (Rule 804(8)(4), the rule requires that the 
testimony as well as the attendance of the witness be 
unavailable. As used in this rule, the phrase "testimony" 
refers to the deposition of the witness, This provision 
was added to. the federal rule by the House Judiciary 
Committee: 
The Committee amended the Rule to insert after the 
word 'attendance' the parenthetical expression' (or, in 
the case of a hearsay exception under subdivi-
sion(b)(2), (3), or (4), his attendance or testimony)'. The 
amendment is designed primarily to require that an 
attempt be made to depose a witness (as well as seek 
his attendance) as a precondition to the witness being 
deemed unavailable. H.R. Rep. No. 650, 93rd Gong., 
1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code & Ad. 
News 7075, 7088. 
-.,; 
The rule conditions applicability of its exceptions on 
inability to procure the witness' attendance or testimony i 
by process or "other reasonable means," thus placing 
the burden of attempting to secure the witness' voluntary 
attendance at trial, or at least the witness' voluntary 
submission to deposition, on the offering party. Hence, 
unavailability is not established merely by showing that 
the witness is beyond the reach of the court's subpoena 
power, and cases so holding, e.g. Bauer v. Pullman Co., 
15 Ohio App.2d 69, 239 N.E.2d 226 (1968), are no longer 
controlling. In criminq.l cases, unavailability is governed 
by constitutional principles. State v. Kearirns, 9 Ohio 
St.3d 228, 460 N.E.2d 245 (1984) (prosecutor's represen-
tations concerning efforts to find witness were inade-
quate to establish unavailability). 
Provisions governing subpoenas are found in Grim. R. 
1; Juv. R. 17; RC 2939.25 to 2939.29 (out-of-state witness 
in criminal cases); 2945.47 (prisoners); 2151.28(G) and 
2151.29 Uuvenile proceedings). Moreover, federal courts 
are authorized to issue subpoenas to United States 
nationals and residents who are in foreign countries in 
order to compel their attendance at state trials. See 
U.S.C. § 1783(s); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972) 
(dissenting opinion). See also RC 2937.18 (detention of 
material witnesses). 
